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By Martina Salini and Samuel Paunila [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) first engaged in the stock-pile management of conventional ammunition in 2013 and has since developed in-house techni-cal, operational, and strategic capabilities for ammunition through-life management. The GICHD 
is an active supporter of the ammunition management community of practice, and has authored and 
contributed to articles on this topic, including raising awareness of ammunition safety and security con-
cepts.1 The GICHD also collaborates with the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) 
at James Madison University by jointly managing the Collaborative Ordnance Database Repository 
(CORD). This article discusses ammunition and explosives management from global to state levels and 
examines risk reduction in this setting, building on the experience of the Ammunition Management 
Advisory Team (AMAT) response mechanism—a joint initiative of the GICHD and the UN Office of 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) since 2019.
In the past decade, states around the world have become aware of 
the safety and security risks associated with explosive ordnance (EO)2 
and the consequences associated with poor management practices. 
Today, an increasing number of states are ready to discuss the sensitive 
topic of risks associated with their stockpiled EO and seek technical 
assistance toward reducing those risks.
Implementing a risk management system is vital for any state 
holding EO, from the early stages of procurement through to the 
stockpiling, use, and disposal of those munitions. As such, a good 
risk management system extends to the entire life cycle of EO and 
is integrated within the framework of national regulations and 
procedures. It is comprehensive and effective but not necessarily 
resource-intensive nor technically difficult to implement.
The global frame of reference for managing ammunition, the Inter-
national Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), was developed 
and made publicly available in 2011 to assist states in addressing 
inherent risks stemming from stockpiling ammunition accord-
ing to their capacity and available material, financial, and technical 
resources. The IATG contain an integrated risk management system, 
providing concrete guidance to technical and policy practitioners on 
risk-management principles and processes, as well as procedures to 
guide risk-based decision-making in ammunition management.
Alongside these guidelines, states and organizations specializing in 
ammunition through-life management are also known as the “ammu-
nition management community of practice.” This article builds on the 
experience of the AMAT, a joint initiative established in 2019 by the 
GICHD and UNODA, to assist states in enhancing ammunition safety 
and security by managing risks from EO as per the IATG.
Global Attention to Ammunition and Explosives Risks
The safety and security risks pertinent to conventional ammunition 
management have captured the attention of states’ arms-control bod-
ies as well as humanitarian and development circles. Connecting dots 
between these risks and sustainable development goals (SDGs) at the 
policy level, this topic has taken center stage in international, regional, 
and, less visibly, national debates.3 Direct testimony of this are the two 
Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Ammunition established 
by the United Nations General Assembly. Established in 2008, the first 
group looked at technical aspects of ammunition stockpile manage-
ment. The work of the GGE resulted in the development of the IATG, 
From Ammunition and 
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and gave birth to the United Nations SaferGuard Programme to main-
tain, update, and disseminate the guidelines.4 The second ammunition 
GGE commenced its work in 2020 and is scheduled to hold its third 
and final session in September 2021. The second GGE’s recommenda-
tions, which will address challenges pertaining to through-life man-
agement and security issues across the ammunition supply chain, will 
be presented to the UN General Assembly for consideration later in 
the fall of 2021.
As discussions continue towards safer and more secure ammuni-
tion stockpiles, states’ demands for technical and financial assistance 
have been on the rise. In the past, a small group of states provided 
assistance that was largely a bilateral affair between the donor and 
recipient states’ militaries, comprising training of personnel in ammu-
nition depots, and technical advice in physical security and stockpile 
management (PSSM). Over the past decade, a handful of international, 
regional, and nongovernmental organizations further developed their 
capabilities and became heavily invested in direct assistance to states 
in ammunition management.5
In addition to bilateral assistance, states in need of assistance are 
also submitting their requests through sub-regional, regional, and 
international channels. In 2020 alone, ten states submitted requests 
for assistance with ammunition management to the United Nations in 
their national reports on their implementation of the UN Programme 
of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons.6 Meanwhile, in 
the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic and associated, compet-
ing national priorities, five states requested assistance from AMAT 
with their stockpiled ammunition.
Lessons Learned
Whenever inherent risks are not properly addressed, stockpiled 
EO pose two distinct threats to local communities, armed forces, the 
economy, and society at large: the risk of accidental explosions and the 
risk of diversion. Mass explosions can result in people killed, injured, 
or displaced, and have significant socioeconomic consequences. 
Additionally, diversion of EO from stockpiles—in-transit and during 
transfer—leads to unchecked proliferation, which has proven to be a 
catalyst for conflict and a contributing factor to the escalation of armed 
violence in several regions of the world.7 Diverted EO has further been 
systematically used to assemble improvised explosive devices (IEDs).8 
The latest available data confirms the gravity and persistence of 
safety and security risks arising from ineffective stockpile manage-
ment: the Small Arms Survey (SAS) recorded 242 unplanned explo-
sions at munition sites (UEMS) over the 2010–2019 period, of which 
39 took place in Africa, 16 in the Americas, 116 in Asia, 70 in Europe, 
and 1 in Oceania.9 Similarly since 2011, Conflict Armament Research 
(CAR) has documented approximately 7,500 cases of ammunition 
diversion.10 Furthermore, in 2018 alone, IEDs used by non-state actors 
were responsible for 9,366 civilian casualties in forty-nine countries.11 
Too often, post-explosion investigations report how an accident 
could have been easily avoided and its impact minimized, if risks 
inherent to EO had been better understood, appreciated, and man-
aged. Hence, risk management should be perceived by states as a fun-
damental measure to prevent accidental explosions, unauthorized 
access, and diversion.12
Effective risk management within this context is a joint undertak-
ing by technical and policy practitioners: a process initiated with a 
state understanding the nature of the risks involved, appreciating 
their magnitude in the surrounding environment and communities, 
and anticipating their consequences if materialized.13 Sound techni-
cal knowledge of EO as well as good management practices should 
be required from the outset. In the long run, for a state to maintain 
safe and secure ammunition and explosives stockpiles, the risk man-
agement process must guide the development and implementation 
of a national strategy and standards, as well as advise the competent 
authority and dedicated work force.14
Managing Risks, Mitigating Threats
In the long run, for a state to maintain safe and secure ammunition and 
explosives stockpiles, the risk management process must guide the 
development and implementation of a national strategy and standards, 
as well as advise the competent authority and dedicated work force.14 
While risks inherent from stockpiling EO cannot be entirely elimi-
nated, the likelihood of an accident can be reduced to as low as reason-
ably practical, and its effects can be mitigated. Similarly, the likelihood 
of diversion can be reduced to near zero. Across its modules, the IATG 
are strong in practical risk management15 and structured around 
gradual improvements considering the diversity of states’ capacities 
and available material, financial, and technical resources.16 Modules 
use three levels of gradual ascending compliance, also known as 
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Image 1. Iterative risk-reduction process in the IATG.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.
risk reduction process levels (RRPLs): basic (RRPL1), intermediate 
(RRPL2), and advanced (RRPL3). All states, regardless of their risk 
baseline and financial and technical capacities, can assess and improve 
management processes based on the IATG, using the RRPLs as bench-
marks to work toward.
 At a minimum, states should aim to maintain processes related to 
stockpiles at RRPL1. This implies the adoption of low-cost actions that 
do not often require extensive technical and material capabilities, and 
can be easily implemented to improve the safety and secu-
rity of EO. For example, the guidance to achieving RRPL1 
entails storing weapons and ammunition separately, segre-
gating certain ammunition types from others in storage and 
transport, regularly ventilating explosives store houses, and removing 
vegetation around them.
Forward-planning is important. When more resources become 
available, a state can upgrade its storage facilities, transport infra-
structure and surveillance processes, and fill the deficit in qualified 
ammunition personnel—gradually advancing to RRPL2 and RRPL3. 
Acquiring knowledge (e.g., through staff training) and applying the 
IATG (i.e., risk management principles and processes) will enable a 
state to identify specific challenges, capabilities, and gaps. Moreover, 
communicating these in appropriate national, sub-regional, and 
regional forums may bring expert advice and services to the state 
from other states and specialized actors. By using the IATG and ser-
vices made available, a state can establish realistic and sustainable 
action plans and/or a strategy toward closing the gaps and commenc-
ing its implementation.
Risk Reduction in Select States
Significant differences in states’ subject knowledge and manage-
ment practices continue to be observed; however, a growing number 
of countries seek international assistance, communicating chal-
lenges and capability gaps. Some also prioritize risks with aging, 
unstable, and obsolete ammunition stockpiles—proactively plan-
ning for risk reduction.
Peru. Peru was the first country to approach UNODA 
for assistance from AMAT. As part of the process for 
their Institutional Transformation (2020–2034) plan, 
Peru is taking its first steps in aligning its policies and practices with 
the IATG. After delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic travel 
restrictions and lockdowns, AMAT is now able to assist Peru with its 
ongoing efforts. Currently, nearly seventy war materiel army officers 
have been trained on the IATG,18 and deployed in-country in various 
management and regulatory functions.19 With technical assistance 
from AMAT, Peru plans to update and streamline the regulatory 
framework between branches of the military into a set of national stan-
dards for ammunition management, as stipulated by national legisla-
tion. These multi-year activities with key ministries and armed forces 
will be accompanied by further training. Additionally, Peru, in 
partnership with the Spanish Ministry of Defence and AMAT, will 
conduct risk assessments of ammunition storage facilities.
Mauritania. In response to a request from the 
Republic of Mauritania for technical assistance in late 
2020, AMAT carried out a preliminary assessment 
mission in support of the Programme National de Déminage 
Humanitaire et de Développement20 (PNDHD). Through this assess-
ment, AMAT visited eleven storage areas, identifying capabilities, 
risks, and needs in weapons and ammunition management. The 
assessments were conducted against the baselines from the IATG and 
the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium 
(MOSAIC). Following the mission, short- and longer-term recom-
mendations were submitted to the PNDHD, aimed at gradually 
improving safety and security management. Pending relaxation of 
COVID-19 travel restrictions, AMAT’s plans with Mauritania include 
a follow-up mission to implement recommendations.
Moldova. For nearly two decades, the Ministry of 
Defense of Moldova, with support from the interna-
tional community, has implemented a program to 
secure and make safe its ammunition stockpiles largely inherited 
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Image 2. Delivery of a virtual training course on the IATG to the Peruvian Army.
following the fall of the Soviet Union.21 
Significant steps have been taken to make the 
management more systems-based, effective, 
and responsive to risks. This has included 
bringing ammunition-related policies and 
practices in line with IATG practices. For 
example, Moldova has gradually reduced the 
number of ammunition storage locations from 
eighteen to five, involving surveillance, trans-
port, and disposal of dysfunctional, unsafe, and 
surplus ammunition.22 Yet, aware of the magni-
tude of the remaining challenge, the Ministry of 
Defense requested in 2020 that AMAT review 
the PSSM program’s progress as well as 
Moldova’s National Army Action Plan 2020–
2024. In response, AMAT visited Moldova’s 
ammunition facilities in October 2020 and, in 
May 2021, convened a technical workshop for Moldovan experts in 
Geneva in July 2021, raising government awareness on ammunition 
through-life management and effective safety and security risk reduc-
tion measures.
Equatorial Guinea. In March 2021, a series of explo-
sions rocked the city of Bata, Equatorial Guinea, result-
ing in more than 100 deaths and 600 injured. The 
explosions annihilated the military camp housing the storage facilities 
in which the explosions originated and destroyed more than 200 build-
ings in the surrounding areas. Following the explosion, Equatorial 
Image 3. Meeting between AMAT and the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Moldova.
Difficult but Passable Road Ahead
In contrast to earlier observations of positive change vis-à-vis states’ 
efforts to reduce risks, and despite the availability of the IATG, the 
root causes of the recent, avoidable humanitarian disasters bear wit-
ness to the under-appreciation of the safety risks associated with EO—
both military ammunition and commercial explosives. Lack of action 
by authorities is often explained as an absence of advanced technical 
knowledge and insufficient financial resources. However, all states 
have access to the IATG and may seek assistance from the commu-
nity of practice, e.g., UN SaferGuard Programme, regional organiza-
tions, other states, or through a dedicated response mechanism such 
as AMAT.25 Additionally, states may take advantage of financial assis-
tance mechanisms and trust funds through which technical assistance 
can also be channeled.26 For many states, the road to progressive and 
sustained risk reduction is long and winding but passable.
Guinea requested technical assistance from UNODA’s Regional Centre 
for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, which resulted in UNODA acti-
vating the quick response mechanism of the UN SaferGuard 
Programme. Within three days of the request, AMAT deployed and 
tasked an expert team to Bata to assist in determining the cause of the 
incident; identifying further explosion risks through a rapid risk 
assessment on the ground; assisting in reducing the risk of further 
explosion incidents through technical advice on risk-mitigation mea-
sures; and providing technical support recommendations to the 
United Nations in light of the coordinated bilateral offers of assistance 
from other states and organizations. During and after the mission, the 
team made next-step recommendations, which the government of 
Equatorial Guinea approved. These included a training program in EO 
safety and security; a new design and relocation of storage areas away 
from populations; and development of national standards and legisla-
tion for EO management.
Of these examples, Peru, Mauritania, and Moldova manifest a pro-
active approach to risk reduction. While each country has differing 
capabilities, the challenges, baselines, and inherent risks from EO 
are the same across countries. Such proactive approaches to reduc-
ing risks in states are important, especially when comparing the costs 
of maintaining an effective ammunition through-life management 
system. This is exemplified by the devastating series of explosions in 
Equatorial Guinea where, besides the tragic loss of life, the estimated 
cost for recovery runs in to the hundreds of millions USD.24 
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Image 4. AMAT expert (right) and United Nations Disaster 
Assessment and Coordination CBRNE23 specialist conducting 
post-explosion investigation at the blast site in Bata.
Conclusion
 
The importance of recognizing the inherent risks posed by stock-
piled EO and the potential consequences stemming from inadequate 
reduction of such risks cannot be understated, marking a state’s first 
step in questioning the adequacy of its policies and standards for 
conduct. The IATG’s RRPLs offer milestones to work toward, gradu-
ally bringing the different components of EO management in line 
with international good practice. When performed well, through-life 
management of EO is a costly affair; yet implementing a system for 
risk reduction is not overly technical or resource intensive. Integrated 
into a state authority’s logistics management processes, proactive risk 
reduction prevents UEMS and diversion—saving lives and property. 
It instills security, accountability, and even slows degradation of stock 
while lessening the impact of risks materialized—human, material, 
financial, political, environmental, or reputational. Among other 
mechanisms for assistance, AMAT and its partners stand ready to sup-
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1. “Ammunition Safety Management: Preventing loss of life and property, and diversion from stockpiles,” Counter-IED Report, 2016; 
characterization of explosive weapons (Explosive Weapon Effects: Final Report, GICHD, 2017); the policy and political environment 
(“Increasing Efforts in SSMA: What Does It Take?” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 2018); available good practice guidance 
(Critical Path Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, UN SaferGuard, 2018); guidance with national standards and 
norms (A Guide to Developing National Standards for Ammunition Management, UN SaferGuard, 2018); and international cooperation and 
assistance (“Ammunition Stockpile Management: A Global Challenge Requiring Global Responses,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction, 2019.
2. The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines define explosive ordnance as ”all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or 
fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket 
and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated 
devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in 
nature.”
3. Bevan, J. (2008), Ammunition-related Political Developments, In Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference Guide. Small Arms Survey, 
Graduate Institute of International Studies p. 12
4. https://unsaferguard.org/
5. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2018) Towards Security, Peace and Sustainable Development: The State of Play and 
Secure Management of Ammunition, Geneva, pp. 27-30.
6. National Reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing 
Instrument (ITI): Albania (2020), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020), Central African Republic (2020), Colombia (2020), Côte d’Ivoire (2020), 
Jamaica (2020), Kenya (2020), Madagascar (2020), Montenegro (2020), Namibia (2020)
7. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2018) Towards Security, Peace and Sustainable Development: The State of Play and 
Secure Management of Ammunition, Geneva, pp. 8-9
8. UNGA (2017), Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, UN Doc. A/RES/72/36, pp. 1-2
9. The Small Arms Survey (SAS) recorded 242 UEMs incidents over the period 2010-2019, out of which 39 took place in Africa, 16 in the 
Americas, 116 in Asia, 70 in Europe, and 1 in Oceania. See: Small Arms Survey, UEMS in Residential Areas, Fact Sheet, March 2020. Available 
at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/V-Fact-sheets/SAS-Fact-Sheet-UEMS.pdf
10. Conflict Armament Research (2018), Conventional Ammunition Diversion, Conflict Armament Research Ltd., London. Available at https://
www.conflictarm.com/download-file/?report_id=3070&file_id=3072)/, p. 27
11. Action on Armed Violence (2018), Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Monitor 2018 (London: AOAV), pp. 27-28. Available at https://aoav.org.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Explosive-Violence-Monitor-2018-v5.pdf. Last accessed 24 May 2021
12. United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (2015), IATG: Introduction to risk management principles and processes, mod. 02.10. Available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-02-10-Introduction-to-Risk-Management-Principles-V.2.pdf
13. Paunila, S. and Hoole, A. (2016), Ammunition Safety Management | Preventing loss of life and property and diversion from stockpiles. Global 
CWD Repository. 131, p. 2 
14. GICHD Strategy 2019-2022
15. United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (2015), IATG: Introduction to risk management principles and processes, mod. 02.10. https://bit.
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16. United Nations Saferguard Programme (2019), A Guide to Developing National Standards, p. 16, https://bit.ly/39126cL.  
17. AMAT advice and services are triggered with a request for assistance from a state or an organization. The analysis of the request often 
warrants desk research and a risk assessment, resulting in the design of a response package or a programme for the state to reduce risks from 
ammunition and explosives in the short and long term
18. The course covered the following modules of the IATG: IATG 01.10 Introduction to the IATG; Ammunition Safety Management – Theory of 
Explosives and Ammunition Classification, Causes of Explosions; IATG 01.50 UN Hazard Classification System; IATG 02.10 Introduction to 
Risk Management Principles and Processes; IATG 03.20 Lotting and Batching; IATG 02.20 NEQ Quantity Distance calculation exercises; IATG 
02.30 Explosive Limit Licensing; IATG 09.10 Security of Ammunition Storage Areas; IATG 06.20/30 Storage and Handling; and IATG 05.30 
Barricades. 
19. As per the feedback compiled to date 27 May 2021, from sixty-two trained army officers ranked from lieutenant to general (fourteen women, 
forty-eight men).
20. The PNDHD is the national authority responsible for ammunition management in Mauritania.
21. The countries supporting Moldova were organised under the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) and include Austria, 
Canada, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
22. Approximately 1,900 metric tons of ammunition have been destroyed since 2004.
23. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE).
24. OCHA/UNDAC (United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team), unpublished daily situation reports, 20-25 March 2021.
25. Contact AMAT via amat.gichd.org or UNSaferGuard.org
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26. For example; Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund (ATT VTF), The Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT), UN Trust Facility Supporting 
Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), etc.
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